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Time to Retire the 
Normal Retirement Age?
Joseph White
Case Western Reserve University
PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES
This book considers policies to respond to three basic perceptions.
First is the common forecast that the proportion of Americans above 
retirement age will increase signifi cantly, and so funding for retirement 
would require a much larger share of national income in the future. This 
raises questions about the adequacy or affordability of both public and 
private retirement arrangements.
Second is the belief that, on average, Americans of any given age 
beyond, say, age 60 will be more able to work in the future than they 
were in the past. They will be more able to work both because they will 
likely be healthier and because the physical demands of work in the 
future, on average, should be less demanding than were the physical 
demands of work in the past. 
If it was only these fi rst two perceptions that were common, at least 
one kind of policy response would be obvious: policies should give peo-
ple strong incentives to work to a later age. The most obvious incentive 
to work until later in life—or sanction against earlier retirement—is to 
raise the age of eligibility for retirement benefi ts. Public policies of this 
type could include raising the normal retirement age for Social Security, 
the age of eligibility for Medicare, or the age at which IRA withdraw-
als may be made without penalty. In addition to such blunt measures, 
policymakers may adopt other methods, such as extensive exhortation, 
to try to get workers to want to work to a later age.
A third perception, however, would seem to require either additions 
to or modifi cations of such policy proposals. In spite of a general trend 
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toward people living longer and healthier lives, a signifi cant portion of 
the population may well not be able to work to a later age than current 
norms, for two reasons. Some people will not be so healthy as to do 
that, even if their condition does not approach any common defi nition 
of “disability.” In addition, even if people want to work, they may fi nd 
few purchasers for their services—either because of prejudice on the 
part of employers or because it is objectively diffi cult for people of their 
age to do the kind of work they have done throughout their careers. 
Additional policies could include measures to make it easier for 
workers to fi nd jobs at later ages. Hence if employers discriminate 
against older workers, this might be addressed with policies against age 
discrimination. If some older workers have had careers that leave them 
physically unable to continue in their previous line of work, a policy 
response might involve job retraining. If employers avoid older work-
ers because of disproportionately high health care costs, most national 
health insurance proposals would eliminate that problem. Modifi cations 
of existing policies could include redefi ning “disability” to make older 
workers eligible even if they are healthier than the current defi nition, or 
measures that create exceptions to any increase in the age of eligibility 
for retirement benefi ts. 
 This chapter examines which set of policies would be appropriate 
given these three perceptions. The merits of policy alternatives depend 
both on judgments about fact, such as whether the three core percep-
tions are true, and on judgments about values, such as the political pref-
erences of the analyst or the decision maker.
POLITICS AND POLICIES
The key values involved in this discussion are redistribution and the 
role of government.
If the third perception is true for a signifi cant portion of workers, 
then government policies to encourage retirement at later ages could 
directly contradict one of the basic purposes of current social insurance. 
Social Security and Medicare (as well as other programs) are designed 
to redistribute resources so as to protect low- and moderate-income 
workers against economic risks.1 If low- and moderate-income workers 
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on average are less able to work to a given age than high-income work-
ers, then policies that seek to force Americans to work later, or punish 
them for retiring earlier, would be inherently regressive, contradicting 
one basic purpose of the programs. 
At the same time, much of the concern about the costs of our aging 
society may be seen largely as an objection to government spending per 
se. The retirement of the baby boomers will increase Social Security 
obligations by about 2 percent of GDP. This is less than the effects of 
President Bush’s tax cuts on the federal budget, and less than the cost 
incurred to pay for public education for the baby boomers themselves. 
It’s a signifi cant amount of money but, if you believe Social Security 
is a good program, the fact that more people will need it does not make 
it less valuable. Hence objection to the expected spending increase for 
Social Security is essentially a value choice, and the value involved is 
size of government, or attitude toward social insurance per se. 
 The projections of increased government health care spending are 
much larger. Yet that increased government spending because of an ag-
ing society would be largely a cost shift from private programs to Medi-
care. In the United States, most individuals move from private to public 
health insurance budgets when they reach age 65; hence government 
spending will increase dramatically if a larger share of the population is 
age 65 and over. No other advanced industrial country has this distinc-
tion between age groups in its health care fi nancing, and therefore aging 
does not appear as though it will have a comparable effect on public (or 
semipublic) health spending anywhere else. Moreover, by any reason-
able measure, the underlying dynamic of health care cost increases per 
capita for all Americans is a far larger challenge than the effects of an 
aging society. The Medicare program, overall, has done better than pri-
vate insurers at controlling costs (not that either has done wonderfully). 
Hence to focus on the costs of Medicare alone refl ects a greater interest 
in the federal budget than in the national burden from health care costs, 
and to suggest privatization of Medicare, given the historical cost expe-
rience, suggests a distinct bias against government programs rather than 
a pure interest in reducing total health care costs.2
Therefore both support for and opposition to policies such as rais-
ing the normal retirement age may be based on ideology. So may sup-
port for such policies as making it easier for employers to hire older 
workers by expanding federal health insurance programs, or support 
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for strict anti-age-discrimination measures. Naturally the material pre-
sented in a collected volume will do little to change anyone’s values. 
Yet the arguments here also involve some empirical concerns that could 
shape policy choices for policymakers whose value preferences are less 
ideologically determinate.
Logical questions include the following:
•  What would be the fi scal and economic effects of policies that 
sought to encourage individuals to work to a greater age?
•  To what extent is the aging society a healthy aging society, so 
that in the future it will be appropriate to expect people to work 
beyond current retirement-age norms?
•  What is the degree of inequality in people’s ability to work past 
current retirement-age norms?
•  To what extent are current norms of retirement a matter of indi-
vidual choice, and to what extent are individuals retiring earlier 
than they have to, so that individuals are choosing to collect from 
government programs when they do not have to do so, and in that 
sense either government is wasting money, or these individuals 
are in some sense exploiting the government?
•  The previous two questions merge into the issue of what explains 
which people currently retire earlier than the norm. For example, 
to what extent is relatively early (pre-normal-retirement-age) re-
tirement now determined by the labor market, so not obviously a 
“choice”? 
•  What would be the consequences if policies did not acknowledge 
inequalities?
•  Admitting that the proper balance between an individual’s ex-
pectations of society and society’s expectations of the individual 
is a matter of personal values; nevertheless we might ask if any 
policies would be likely to create the best balance because they 
would in some way increase the resources available to both indi-
viduals and society.
At the conference that gave rise to this volume (detailed in the next 
paragraph), I participated in a panel discussion titled “Boomers’ Work 
and Retirement Plans.” In the balance of this chapter I will suggest 
some ways in which the analyses presented by the participants on that 
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panel address the questions outlined above; then I will make the case 
for a particular policy modifi cation. I will propose replacing the normal 
retirement age with a different standard for entitlement to full benefi ts: 
a combination of age and years in the workforce. 
BOOMERS’ WORK AND RETIREMENT PLANS
At the National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) conference 
“Older and Out of Work: Jobs and Social Insurance for a Changing 
Economy,” held January 19–20, 2006, in Washington, D.C., the major-
ity of topics related to the question of to what extent job opportunities 
would exist for older workers, and to strategies to help workers fi nd 
jobs in the face of diffi culties. Eugene Steuerle, codirector of the Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center, presented a paper titled When to Retire: 
Your Most Important Retirement Decision, based on work he did with 
Urban Institute colleagues Barbara Butrica and Karen Smith. Steuerle’s 
presentation was in the minority; it emphasized the premise that the 
primary policy need is to convince workers to stay in the workforce 
later in life, and so the policy challenge is to fi nd ways to encourage 
that conviction.
Their data show that, for most households, the projected value of 
Social Security and Medicare benefi ts far exceeds the value of the rest 
of their retirement portfolios. Steuerle demonstrates large benefi ts to 
individuals, in terms of larger annual incomes while in retirement, and 
to the economy as a whole, in terms of a larger economy from which 
to fund benefi ts, from people working later. Delaying retirement makes 
it more affordable, however it is funded, for two reasons: 1) a shorter 
period that must be covered by the funds, and 2) a greater accumula-
tion of funds. The implication of these points is that Social Security and 
Medicare policies should be changed to encourage people to work to 
later ages (Butrica, Smith, and Steuerle 2006). 
In published papers and talks, Steuerle has frequently suggested 
raising the normal retirement age. He has also proposed more modest 
steps, such as changing the Social Security benefi t formula to include 
every year worked. Such a reform would raise individual benefi ts ac-
cording to years in the workforce beyond 35, and so would eliminate 
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the current situation, in which for some workers a year of extra work at 
a lower-than-trend salary (for example, part-time) would not increase 
future monthly payments. As Steuerle has argued, there are plausible 
equity reasons why current law, which only counts the fi rst 35 years of 
contributions, may seem unfair in addition to creating a disincentive for 
further work (Steuerle and Spiro 1999).
Butrica, Smith, and Steuerle (2006) are clearly correct in arguing 
that the aggregate affordability of retirement is fundamentally a labor 
market question. Retirement is a choice about whether to be in the la-
bor market. Whether retirees claim income through the government, 
through family ties, or through contracts involving capital investment, 
in all cases they must be supported by the product of workers. The most 
fundamental way to make it easier for workers (as a group) to support 
retirees (as a group) is to turn some of those retirees into workers. While 
this point may seem a conservative one in the U.S. debate—because 
it seems to call for raising retirement ages—it is just basic math. The 
March 2000 Special European Council in Lisbon concluded that fi nding 
ways to keep older workers in the workforce is a superior alternative to 
cutting benefi t rates, both because it seems less painful and because it 
would in theory be better for the economy as a whole.3 
However, it is not realistic to assume that if people are convinced to 
seek work, jobs will be there for them. The EU’s stated commitment to 
the Lisbon vision of expanded labor force participation does not create 
the necessary jobs (Economic Policy Committee 2000, pp. 41–45). In 
fact there have been many cases throughout the past century in which 
national policymakers have encouraged retirement precisely because 
they did not think there were enough jobs to go around, and they be-
lieved it more important to employ younger workers. While some of 
those policies may have been mistaken, it may be as reasonable to as-
sume a fi xed labor demand as a conveniently expanding one. If there 
are suddenly more workers, perhaps that will drive down the income of 
younger workers rather than increase national product. This is a subject 
I will not explore in this chapter, but it is highly unlikely that the job 
supply in any country will simply expand to fi t new levels of desire to 
work, without reducing average wages. Lower wages from increased 
competition for work, in turn, would reduce younger workers’ take-
home pay just as clearly (though with different incidence) as higher 
taxes would.
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In addition to the practical questions about labor markets, Steuerle’s 
position begs the equity questions. One can dismiss the concern, as he 
did in a conference call in January 2006 just before the NASI confer-
ence, by arguing that in 1950 the average retirement age was 68, jobs 
were on average more physically demanding, and people were on aver-
age not as healthy. Yet it is less than clear that our goal for 2050 should 
be that peoples’ lives resemble those a century before. After all, we do 
not consider the standard of living in 1907 an appropriate standard for 
today. Moreover, if socioeconomic disparities are on average increasing 
(and there is reason to think they have since at least 1973), then even 
if a later retirement age is on average justifi ed, it may seem even more 
inequitable to require later retirement, or reduce benefi ts for earlier re-
tirement, for the people who are least able to delay their retirement.
Joanna Lahey’s work addresses one of the factual issues: the ex-
tent of discrimination against older workers. She reports on research in 
which she sent out resumes for fi ctional job applicants of varying ages 
in response to newspaper want ads in Boston and in St. Petersburg, 
Florida. She found a clear difference in the rates at which employers 
invited these fi ctional older and younger employees to come in for job 
interviews: “A younger worker in either state is more than 40 percent 
more likely to be called back for an interview than an older worker, 
where older is defi ned as age 50 or older,” notes Lahey (2005, p. 3). 
This means an older worker must reply to many more ads in order to 
get an interview, which surely must mean it is harder to fi nd a job when 
older.
Lahey thus provides strong evidence of hiring discrimination. Her 
data does not support any particular explanation of the discrimination. 
She suggests reasons why antidiscrimination statutes may backfi re and 
adds that fear of health care costs may be a factor but cannot easily be 
proved. Lahey’s work also does not directly address the equity question 
of whether some kinds of older workers will face greater discrimination 
than others. Her work does suggest that it is easier to get hired with 
scarcer skills, and one might infer that scarcity of skills has a class dif-
ferential, but her evidence does not address that question.4 
Marc Freedman and his colleagues at Civic Ventures argue for a 
positive view of baby boomers as a resource that can address a wide 
range of social problems. Freedman cites examples of bureaucrats who 
become teachers, physicians who volunteer for free clinics, and academ-
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ics who become lobbyists (Freedman 2004; Freedman and Moen 2005). 
In an ideal world, workers would not only stay in the labor market but, 
if there were impediments to continuing in their previous careers, ac-
cept positions that might be of lower prestige but be of great social 
use (e.g., in day care or aftercare).5 Freedman (2006) also reports on a 
survey done from March to April of 2005 (Freedman 2005). The study 
concludes that preboomers and leading-edge boomers want to work, 
and to a substantial extent seek meaningful work in which they could 
do good, e.g., in education and social services. In this and other works, 
Freedman consistently argues that what many seniors will want is a 
new career, with the traditional retirement years morphing into a new 
stage of work. Most importantly for policy purposes, Freedman and his 
colleagues argue that many baby boomers want to work in this way, but 
that the problem is to fi nd public policies that enable such work, rather 
than policies that force people to continue working. Hence his advocacy 
is very different from Steuerle’s campaign to lower benefi ts for people 
who do not work later than the current retirement age. 
All of this is an attractive vision, because it suggests a virtuous fi t 
between personal interests and social needs. The argument that many 
people will want to fi nd a kind of postretirement career—keeping busy 
for fewer hours with much lower incomes but still doing personally 
rewarding work with much less stress—is surely correct. Yet Freedman 
(2005, p. 3) notes that “if the old norm for retirement was the golden 
years focused on leisure, the new default position seems to be a part-
time job in the retail sector.” However, the MetLife Foundation/Civic 
Ventures New Face of Work Survey, conducted in 2005, fi nds that, in-
stead of working in retail or fast food, many Americans in their 60s 
and 70s “want to focus their accumulated time, talent, and experience 
on work that directly contributes to social renewal” (Freedman 2005, 
p. 3). The survey data suggest that “despite strong interest in pursuing 
new work for the greater good, few of those surveyed thought it would 
be very easy to fi nd this type of engagement” (Freedman 2005, p. 4). 
Freedman also notes that many of the people who might want to do 
some form of social service work aren’t trained for it. Thus his analysis 
calls for government support of retraining, while noting that nonprofi t 
organizations need to somehow be convinced to seek out the senior 
workforce.
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Hence, the desire to work in service capacities such as teaching, 
nursing, health services, and child care does not in itself suggest that an 
aging population will be more affordable for society. The jobs have to 
exist; in many cases that means the public sector would have to pay for 
them, and opponents of government spending for pensions tend to be 
not much more supportive of public spending for education, health, and 
child care. Moreover, the arguments and examples made by Freedman 
and his colleagues have a clear upper-middle-class focus, involving re-
tirement by skilled professionals. We can agree that fi nding ways for 
these people to continue to contribute is highly desirable but still worry 
about the rest of the population. 
One of the purposes of Freedman and the Civic Venture group’s 
work is to counter the idea that the future burden of an aging society 
is in some way due to the selfi shness of baby boomers. Objective mea-
sures of boomer selfi shness appear to be lacking: from an economic 
standpoint, they seem not to have exploited other demographic groups 
because of their large cohort size. There is evidence, however, that the 
large size of the boomer cohorts has caused individual baby boomers, 
on average, to face unfavorable conditions in the labor market and po-
tentially negative long-term effects in the housing market and other fi -
nancial asset markets. From this perspective, those cohorts—or at least 
the last two-thirds of the boomer group—may deserve more sympathy 
than blame (White 2003, pp. 119–125).6 Triest, Sapozhnikov, and Sass 
(2006) address one aspect of the pattern.
If future seniors are expected to work more, one basic question that 
presents itself is, “What will be the level of demand for those work-
ers?” One way to look at demand for older workers is to look at relative 
wages for younger and older workers. The past four decades showed 
the emergence of an “experience premium,” which could be interpreted 
as evidence of demand for older workers. Triest shows, however, that 
this was largely a result of the baby boom cohort: when that cohort was 
young, its numbers depressed wages for young workers, making it look 
as if experience were gaining value; as the baby boomers have grown 
older, however, the premium has eroded.7 There are also questions of 
how any age patterns might be related to education and occupation.
What, then, are the implications of this work? If the real lesson is 
the fact that cohort size matters, then we might expect older boomers 
to have trouble fi nding jobs simply because they will still be competing 
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with one another for the limited set of jobs appropriate for older work-
ers. Hence, for theories that the retirement of the boomers in particu-
lar may be made affordable by expecting them to work later, a further 
complication is that there may be too many of them for this solution 
to work very well. In the meantime, industrial and occupational shifts 
could also reduce the employment prospects of at least some older po-
tential workers.
None of the papers presented at the NASI conference, in spite of 
their many virtues, suggest policies to cope with issues such as the dif-
ferences in physical ability to continue work, or the equity of expecting 
an equal retirement age for all workers. Therefore, in the second half 
of this chapter, I will present some sketchy data relevant to those issues 
and outline the case for reforming the terms of entitlement to full Social 
Security benefi ts.
SOME MODEST EVIDENCE ABOUT EQUITY
Would raising the normal retirement age have particularly negative 
consequences for workers with lower incomes and education, and so 
raise serious equity concerns? Consider these indicators.
First, there is clear evidence that life expectancy around retirement 
age is positively correlated with income and strongly positively corre-
lated with education. Panis and Lilliard (1999), for example, estimate 
life expectancies at age 60 and fi nd a complex pattern in which how 
these variables matter varies between men and women. Nevertheless, 
education and income on average are strongly associated with life ex-
pectancy. For example, life expectancy at age 60 is 5.4 years greater 
for white male college graduates at the seventy-fi fth income percentile 
than for white male high school dropouts at the twenty-fi fth percentile 
of income.8
Second, there is equally clear evidence that, at least until now, “the 
earlier men retire, the more likely they are to be in poorer health and 
have higher mortality risk than those retiring at age 65” (Waldron 2004, 
p. 2). Men who retire before the normal retirement age of 65 have had 
lower odds of surviving to age 80 than have those who wait until age 
65; this effect has been independent of education or other factors, and a 
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stronger predictor than education, race, or marital status. The low earn-
ings group that has taken earliest retirement has been particularly likely 
to be in poorer health (Waldron 2002, 2004). This suggests that early 
retirement is not simply a matter of selfi shness or poor public policies 
that create inappropriate incentives: to some extent it refl ects real differ-
ences in life situations, such as the state of one’s health.
Third, older workers appear to be especially at risk from injuries at 
the workplace, and this is particularly true of workers in more physical 
occupations. In 2003, “the fatality rate for older workers (11.3 fatali-
ties for 100,000 workers) was nearly 3 times that of younger workers” 
(Rogers and Wiatrowski 2005, p. 25). This appears to be less a mat-
ter of incidence of accidents and more a matter of their consequences. 
For example, “twenty percent of older truck driver injuries result in 
fractures, compared with 9.3 percent for all truck drivers” (Rogers and 
Wiatrowski 2005, p. 28). Older workers are particularly prone to falls, 
even in jobs such as retail sales.
All of these indicators support common-sense fears about the dis-
tributional impacts of raising the retirement age. As Barry Bosworth, 
a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, once commented, “That’s 
easy for white-collar workers like us to suggest. But talk to laborers.” In 
the words of the wife of a printing press operator, it “might be okay for 
somebody who sits on their butt all the time.” Or, as President Clinton 
put it, “It might be fi ne for somebody like me, who’s always had a desk 
job. But what about the people who have laboring jobs? What about 
people who really work with their hands and their backs?” (Calmes 
1997, p. A20).
Yet there is another, subtler, inequity. Alert readers may have no-
ticed that I have tried always to express the equity issue in terms of 
ability to “work later” rather than ability to “work longer.” There is a 
reason.
The Other Inequity 
One point that seems to get lost in the standard discussion of rais-
ing retirement ages is that the people who can work to the latest ages 
seem likely to, on average, start their period of full-time work at later 
ages. Jobs that require less physical labor generally require more edu-
cational attainment. So, for example, college professors (the example 
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of individuals who want to have second, socially useful careers in one 
of Freedman’s articles)9 are likely to have waited until at least age 27 
before entering the workforce full-time (assuming graduation from col-
lege at age 22 and fi ve years to PhD). Attorneys will have begun their 
careers around age 25; physicians will have begun residency around 
age 26; MBAs will start around age 24. Yet construction workers likely 
begin upon graduation from high school, at age 18. Operators of heavy 
machinery may be prevented from taking such jobs until age 25, but 
we would expect them to have worked in other jobs after high school 
graduation.
What this means is, if a construction worker with a terminal high 
school diploma works steadily to age 60, he will have worked as many 
full-time years as the attorney who works until age 67 (42 years in each 
case). As a rough hypothesis, the people who can work latest will have 
also been educated longer. As a result, expecting the same normal retire-
ment age for all workers is doubly unfair: the workers who are least able 
to work later will have to work longer in order to earn full benefi ts.
Unfortunately, I am aware of no studies that relate work prospects 
and ability to work at later ages directly to years in the workforce.10 
Yet we do have some evidence about behavior that seems to fi t the 
hypothesis.
First, we know that people who wait to retire at age 65 are distinctly 
more likely to have a college education than most retirees, and that 
people who retire at age 62 are distinctly less likely to have graduated 
from college (Waldron 2004).
Second, we know that “physical job demands fall signifi cantly 
with educational attainment. For example, in 2002, 28 percent of older 
workers who did not attend college reported that their jobs require lots 
of physical effort all or almost all of the time, compared with only 8 
percent of college graduates” (Johnson 2004, p. 53). Such a fi nding 
may understate the degree of the problem, because some of the people 
whose jobs required greater physical effort would have already left the 
workforce, so would not get counted. Hence, while it is clear that trans-
formations in the nature of work mean that a larger percentage of jobs 
can be done by older workers, there remains a signifi cant proportion of 
jobs that do not fi t many older workers.
Third, we know that older workers in fact are somewhat less likely 
than the norm to work in jobs like construction, and somewhat more 
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likely to work in some sort of management or professional capacity. 
Having a management or professional occupation is, of course, much 
more strongly related to education.11 While these data are weak and 
partial—occupational categories are huge and many factors infl u-
ence them—it does fi t the sense that workers who enter the workforce 
at an earlier age are more likely to have jobs that encourage earlier 
retirement.
Fourth, expectations that social changes will greatly increase the 
number of seniors who are highly educated and so able to work later 
would not appear to be based on data. The boomer cohorts do include 
a far larger share of college graduates than did their predecessors: 30 
percent of those who turn age 62 in 2008–2012, compared to 17 percent 
for the group that turned age 62 in 1993–1997. But at that point (2012), 
levels of educational attainment will level off, remaining “roughly con-
stant for future birth cohorts through those that turn 62 in 2028–2032” 
(Smith and Toder 2005, p. 1). In fact, the proportion of the population 
born in 1970–1975 that had a college diploma in 2000 was no greater 
than the proportion born in 1946–1950 that had a diploma that year.12 
The future economy may give more of its rewards to people who are 
more highly educated, and may in fact have less of a place for physical 
labor. Yet the rates of education do not seem to be improving, which 
would just cause more people to be left behind.
Papers at the NASI conference and other evidence also suggest that 
the market demand for lower-educated older workers in particular could 
be weak. The worry remains that there could be “a sorry mismatch of 
supply and demand. Those with the most skill and education will be the 
most needed, but also the most able to retire; those with the least educa-
tion will have a greater need for, but slimmer prospects of, continued 
work” (Kosterlitz 1997, p. 1885).
In short, while more appropriate research is surely desirable, there 
is good reason to fear that the following fi ve points are true:
 1)  There will be a cadre of Americans into the foreseeable future 
who will have diffi culty fi nding jobs at later ages, either be-
cause of market conditions or because of their own physical 
inability to do the jobs.
 2)  This group on average will have started full-time work at an 
earlier age.
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 3)  This group on average will have lower working incomes and 
fewer nongovernmental resources to support retirement.
 4)  This group will have shorter life expectancies as they near re-
tirement age, so raising the age of eligibility for government 
benefi ts will have a regressive effect on them, cutting their to-
tal benefi ts by a larger share than the total benefi ts for other 
retirees.
 5)  This group already contributes for a relatively large number of 
years compared to the number of years for which they collect 
benefi ts. Any measures that raise the retirement age will not 
only make this group’s benefi t less adequate, but will increase 
the preexisting inequity.13
Given these conclusions, there is good reason to worry that raising the 
retirement age would contradict the purposes of Social Security.
HOW TO REDEFINE ELIGIBILITY
The basic problem is that a fi xed age of normal retirement fails to 
recognize both inequities: that some people cannot work as late, and 
that to a substantial extent the same people began work earlier.
To the extent that these two factors are correlated, the appropriate 
response would be to base eligibility for full benefi ts not on age, but on 
years in the workforce.
If entitlement to full benefi ts required 45 years in the workforce, 
then, barring periods of joblessness, the usual age of full eligibility for 
a person whose education ended with high school graduation would be 
63; for an individual whose formal education ended with college gradu-
ation at age 22 it would be 67; and for an attorney, with law degree 
completed at age 25, it would be age 70.
Basing eligibility on years of service is hardly unprecedented in the 
pension world. There are some pension schemes in which entitlement is 
based solely on years of service, particularly pensions for the military 
and some teachers. More common, it appears, is a compromise in which 
age and years of service both determine eligibility. Thus, in the old Civil 
Service Retirement System, workers earned credits to pensions for each 
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year of work. They could take the full pension to which the credits 
entitled them at various combinations of age and service (e.g., 65 with 
20 years, or 55 with 30 years). But they could earn larger pensions by 
working longer. The Italian social security system includes a “seniority 
pension” available at age 57 with 35 years of contributions or regard-
less of age with 38 years of contributions. Some other countries have 
systems in which the amount of pension depends directly on the number 
of years of contributions; for instance, in Switzerland, receiving full 
benefi ts requires that contributions be made in all years from age 21 to 
65.14 Social Security’s own requirement that benefi ts be based on the 
highest 35 years of contributions means that for someone to work fewer 
than 35 years will cause a reduction to the base benefi t formula.
Eligibility based on age has some signifi cant advantages. Most sim-
ply, it is easy to measure. It also represents a social notion of the age 
at which people should be able to retire because of the effects of age, 
and so is both simpler than and should have more support than will any 
calculation of years worked. Nevertheless, eligibility based on years 
working also has a fairly simple rationale: retirement is earned by con-
tributions to the society. My personal belief is that both basic standards 
are appropriate and so they should be combined.
Current law will raise the normal retirement age to 67 by 2022. If 
policymakers were worried about the equity consequences of that stan-
dard, changing the basis to age 67 or 45 years of full-time-equivalent 
employment would have the effect of raising it for the group that is 
most likely both to be able to work later and to live longer, while low-
ering it for the group that most needs to retire earlier and has shorter 
life expectancies. If policymakers were to consider, as Steuerle would 
prefer, further raising the normal retirement age, it would be more fair 
if they did so in a way that did not change the situation of the most vul-
nerable workers (Steuerle and Bakija 1994). For instance, raising the 
normal retirement age to 70 could be accompanied by a provision that 
allowed full benefi ts for 48 years in the workforce. This would make the 
standard really age 70 for college graduates, but 73 for attorneys and 66 
for construction workers (if we assume continuous employment, which 
may be doubted).
Such a system, while more fair than the alternative, would raise 
some nontrivial practical issues:
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• Wouldn’t a years-in-the-workforce standard discriminate against 
people who leave the workforce to care for children? Yes, it would. 
Then again, current law, because benefi ts are based on the top 35 years 
of earnings, also lowers benefi ts for those who spend many years rear-
ing children; while the spousal and survivor benefi ts, in contrast, favor 
nonworking parents. On the whole, this is a separate issue; if desired, 
it would be easy enough to give work credits for child-rearing, but 
that involves its own set of policy values. For instance, if work cred-
its were given for child-rearing, perhaps the spousal benefi t should be 
modifi ed.
• How would being “in the workforce” be measured? This is not so 
easy. Employers could be required to report whether each employee is 
full-time or part-time, and to either report hours worked or classify the 
employee according to some limited set of categories. While this would 
be burdensome, it at a minimum would be much easier than maintain-
ing any system of contributions into private accounts.15 Such data could 
also be checked against records of school enrollment. It appears likely 
that, for national security reasons, institutions of higher education are 
going to be required to track students’ enrollment status anyway; the 
same record-keeping could be applied to all students, not just interna-
tional ones.
• What about the self-employed? That could be a problem. Under 
current law, individuals contribute to Social Security as part of income 
tax fi ling, and it is not necessary to distinguish whether that is from full-
time or some other time of employment. If a person were self-employed 
for his or her entire career, the top 35 years of contributions would be 
counted; if some of those years are quite low, that affects the benefi t 
calculation but not when a person is entitled to full benefi ts. If people 
could simply defi ne self-employment on their own terms, an unusu-
ally strategic and foresighted pre-law undergraduate might start a very 
small business, pay nominal Social Security self-employment tax, do 
so through law school, and thus entitle herself to full Social Security 
benefi ts seven years earlier than her classmate who was not so clever. 
One approach that might reduce such problems would be to assume that 
full-time students were not working, and then set some standards as to 
what levels of income (if self-employed) or reported hours worked (if 
partially employed by others) would count as equivalent to years or 
fractions of years in the workforce.
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These diffi culties are signifi cant enough that I see changing to a 
system in which full entitlement depends on both age and years in the 
workforce as a proposal that defi nitely needs more study. Nevertheless, 
changing the basis of eligibility would have the merit of recognizing 
both sides of this volume’s topic. Much of the analysis in this book 
recognizes that the ability of future older workers to fi nd and work 
in jobs will be very unequally distributed. From this perspective, the 
common call to raise the retirement age would seem perverse. Yet that 
proposal has been an important theme in the discourse on social insur-
ance policy for many years, and the case for encouraging people to 
remain in the labor market, particularly as opposed to other methods to 
make Social Security more affordable, is plausible. Changing the basis 
of full eligibility from age alone to a mix of age and years in the work-
force offers a way to approximately match the terms of the program 
to the conditions of peoples’ working lives. It could accommodate the 
legitimate arguments for raising the retirement age without creating 
severe inequities.
CONCLUSION
The conundrum that this chapter addresses could be addressed with 
many policies instead of or in addition to a change in our national pen-
sion guarantee. For example, anything resembling the national health 
insurance systems that exist in all other rich democracies would greatly 
decrease employers’ incentive to avoid hiring older workers. If poli-
cymakers want to encourage upper-income workers to keep working, 
they could raise the age at which IRA funds may be withdrawn without 
penalty. 
At the same time, to a certain extent the supposed problem may be 
one that the market will ameliorate without much policy action. If the 
problem is a lack of demand for older workers, then if there are fewer 
younger workers, employers will be faced with a choice: bid up the 
salaries of younger workers, or fi nd ways to come to terms with an 
older workforce. They may prefer the latter option. If the problem is 
that older people don’t want to work, then many indications suggest 
that a shortfall in other sources of income will leave them little choice.
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Finally, some of the attendant issues in today’s work world could 
imply that a focus on income for older citizens misses the main eco-
nomic concern. The debate on outsourcing addresses a much more sig-
nifi cant question: whether workers of any sort will have decent jobs and 
wages. Even pensions are not as important as jobs.
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the National Academy on So-
cial Insurance, which hosted the “Older and Out of Work” conference, 
the key question is whether our national social insurance programs can 
or should be changed. The case for increasing the age of eligibility for 
Medicare is exceedingly weak. Our health care problems are that too 
many younger people do not have insurance, and that it is too costly for 
everyone, not that too many older people are insured. There is more of 
a case for recognizing the ability of some workers to work later by rais-
ing the normal retirement age. Yet the inequities of that approach make 
it highly suspect. Instead of simply raising the normal retirement age, it 
is time to consider replacing it, as the basis for full eligibility for Social 
Security, with a combination of age and years in the workforce.
Notes
This chapter is an adapted version of a commentary delivered at the eighteenth annual 
Policy Research Conference of the National Academy of Social Insurance, “Older and 
Out of Work: Jobs and Social Insurance for a Changing Economy,” held in Washington, 
D.C., January 19–20, 2006. 
 1. The redistributive purpose of Social Security is explicit in the benefi t formula. It 
is generally agreed that the redistributive benefi ts outweigh the regressive con-
tribution scheme. By standard defi nition—i.e., the tax is proportional to income 
and the benefi t is seemingly the same for everyone—Medicare may not seem re-
distributive. Yet with higher-income people paying more, lower-income less, and 
everyone receiving the same entitlement, it clearly redistributes ability to consume 
health care down the income scale, compared to what the market would provide.
  2. For discussion of Medicare costs see White (2003); for a broader discussion of ag-
ing and health care costs see White (2004). Analyses that claim an aging popula-
tion will greatly increase costs confuse the effect of age with the effect of time un-
til death; for confi rmation of this point see Chernichovsky and Markowitz (2003), 
Stearns and Norton (2003), and Gray (2005). 
  3. For a good example see OECD (2004); for earlier citations see White (2004). 
  4. For a good summary of other reasons employers might avoid older workers, or 
discriminate against them in other ways, see Economic Policy Institute (2005). 
  5. See Adler (2002); an admirable example is the gentleman who has supervised the 
after-care program at my daughter’s elementary school.
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 6. The evidence is that the fi rst fi ve years or so of the boomers did okay, because that 
fi ve-year cohort (1946–1950) was basically competing with the smaller cohorts 
that preceded it. But by about 1952, newborn boomers were headed for much 
tougher fi nancial times.
  7. See Triest, Sapozhnikov, and Sass (2006); my statements here are based on a draft 
of that paper. It should be understood that many other effects must be relevant to 
these data. 
  8. There is roughly a seven-year difference by gender holding income and education 
gradients constant, and about a one-year difference by race, compared to a fi ve- or 
six-year difference on the income/education combination cited here. Most of the 
difference for males occurs between an individual with median income and a high 
school diploma and the lower income and education group. Yet for females, in the 
estimates, the median income and high school education group is about halfway 
between the higher and lower groups. Why the income and education patterns dif-
fer by gender could be a subject for much speculation. For the data, see Panis and 
Lillard (1999), Table 2.4.
  9. This example comes from Freedman and Moen (2005).
 10. I mean the statement literally: there may be some; I just haven’t found them.
 11. See the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey Data for 2004, Tables 10 and 
15. For instance, 6.2 percent of workers over age 65 worked in “natural resources, 
construction, and maintenance,” compared to 10.5 percent of all workers. For the 
38.2 percent of workers with “management/professional” jobs, the education gra-
dient was striking: only 16.3 percent of those with only a high school diploma had 
such jobs, while over 90 percent of those with professional or doctoral degrees did 
(author’s calculations).
  12. Bauman and Graf (2003). This result may be partially due to immigration; in other 
words, rates of education for native-born Americans may have risen moderately, 
but an infl ux of younger immigrants have offset that effect on the proportion of 
younger residents with college degrees.
  13. Inequity here involves the number of years in retirement relative to the number of 
years working. If the years of retirement are reduced and years working increased 
by the same number of years, this will have a larger proportional effect on those 
with fewer years of retirement to begin with. That’s algebraically simple if each 
group has the same number of years working, because all that matters is the ratio of 
years in retirement. Reducing 15 years of benefi ts by three is a 20 percent cut, while 
reducing 12 years of benefi ts by 3 is a 25 percent reduction. If the shorter-lived 
group actually worked longer than the longer-lived group, the effect still favors the 
longer-lived group so long as more time is spent in work than in retirement.
  14. Short descriptions of national systems may be found at http://www.ssa/gov/policy/
docs/progdesc/ssptw/ (accessed January 23, 2007).
 15. Reports on full-time status would not require the same kind of computerization, 
real-time reporting, and immediate accuracy that would be required for private 
accounts. For example, records could be corrected annually without any worries 
that workers had been deprived of earnings on investments in the interim.
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